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in the range of !0.2 to !0.3, looking at both employment and hours of work.
David Neumark Elizabeth T. Powers
Public Policy Institute of California Institute of Government and Public Affairs
500 Washington Street and Department of Economics
Suite 800 University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana






The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program was begun in 1974 to provide a 
uniform federal safety net for the elderly, blind, and disabled.  In addition, many states 
supplement the benefits payable under SSI.  The SSI program is means-tested, with both income 
limits and asset limits.  As such, those on the margin of eligibility for the elderly component of 
the program face incentives to reduce labor supply (or earnings) prior to becoming eligible.
1  
Although the effects of means-tested income support programs on labor supply have been widely 
researched in the context of welfare programs for younger individuals and families (e.g., Moffitt, 
1992; Blank, 2002), little work has been done on what is effectively a welfare program for the 
elderly.  In prior research, though, we used cross-state variation in the benefit payments available 
under SSI to identify the effects of SSI on the labor supply of potential SSI participants as they 
approach the age of eligibility, finding evidence of labor supply declines (Neumark and Powers, 
2000).
2   
Our evidence that SSI creates disincentives for work and saving among older individuals 
is limited in two respects.  First, the data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) that were used were for a small number of years in the mid-1980s to the early 1990s 
(1984, 1990, and 1991, to be exact).  Second, the analysis was largely limited to using cross-state 
variation in SSI benefit levels to identify the effects of SSI, because there was little time-series 
variation in SSI benefits from 1984 to 1991.  In contrast, this paper uses annual Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data covering 1979-2000 to study the effects of SSI on labor supply.  
This data source permits us to re-examine our earlier evidence on these effects using the same 
identification strategy over a much longer period.  More importantly, the CPS data allow us to 
                                                 
1 In contrast, these incentives are unlikely or less likely to play a role for participants in the disabled and especially 
the blind components of the program, which we generally ignore in this paper.  
2 Both the asset and income limits also create incentives to reduce saving near the age of eligibility.  This paper does 
not study saving, but see Neumark and Powers (1998) for evidence that SSI also reduces saving.  
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use an alternative strategy that exploits changes in SSI benefit levels over time, within states, and 
hence relies on a better control sample consisting of observations on individuals residing in the 
same state with similar likelihoods of SSI participation, in periods when SSI benefits differed.    
II. The SSI Program 
The SSI program was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1972 and begun in 1974.  Prior to 
that year, three separate programs established in the original Social Security Act of 1935 and its 
1950 amendments provided means-tested assistance for individuals who were either ineligible 
for Social Security or whose Social Security benefits were inadequate: Old-Age Assistance, Aid 
to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled.  However, federal law established 
only broad guidelines for these three programs, and states had great flexibility in setting program 
rules and benefit levels (including assessing individuals’ needs).  SSI was established to provide 
a uniform income floor and common eligibility requirements, while states were free to 
supplement SSI payments subject to their own eligibility rules, with one exception noted below.   
Three factors generate variation across states in SSI benefit levels.
3  First, states can 
choose an optional benefit supplement.  They can administer the supplemental program 
themselves, or choose to have the Social Security Administration administer their supplemental 
programs as long as they maintain the same eligibility rules as the federal program (except that 
they are allowed to exclude additional items from income in determining eligibility for the state 
supplement).  Second, Congress imposed mandatory supplements to ensure that in no state 
would citizens already in state programs receive lower benefits in the federal program than they 
had previously received under the state program.  Because these mandatory supplements did not 
apply to individuals first becoming eligible for SSI in 1974 or later, they now apply to very few 
                                                 
3 The discussion here refers to cash benefits.  Some states also fund other expenses for SSI recipients, such as group 
living facilities (Committee on Ways and Means, 2000).   
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individuals.  Since we study behavior of individuals approaching the age of eligibility for SSI, 
we never need to account for these mandatory supplements.  Third, some constraints were 
imposed on states’ ability to alter supplemental payments, as in 1976 Congress also mandated 
that states pass along cost-of-living increases in federal benefits (to avoid states cutting their 
benefits to offset these increases).  States can choose to either keep benefit levels or total 
expenditures at least as high as the previous year in nominal terms.
4  The state supplementation 
can be quite dramatic.  As of January 2000, the maximum federal benefit was $512 for 
individuals, and $769 for couples (when both individuals are aged 65 or over).  In that same year 
the maximum individual (couple) benefit was $874 ($1,297) in Alaska, $747 ($1,094) in 
Connecticut, and $692 ($1,229) in California.  However, many states have far more moderate 
supplements and 25 had none.   
SSI is a means-tested program.  As a consequence, benefits are reduced by income from 
other sources, including Social Security, and by financial resources.  The federal benefit 
reduction formula disregards the first $65 of earned income, and above that reduces the SSI 
benefit by 50 cents for every $1 of earned income.  It also disregards the first $20 of unearned 
income (including Social Security benefits) and above that reduces the SSI benefit dollar-for-
dollar with unearned income.  Finally, the SSI benefit is reduced dollar-for-dollar with any other 
means-tested transfer income.
5  The limitation on financial resources is imposed via an asset 
limit, above which the individual or couple is ineligible for any benefit.  As of 2000 the federal 
                                                 
4 These details come from U.S. Social Security Administration (2002) and U.S. Committee on Ways and Means 
(2000). 
5 In addition, income from certain home energy and support and maintenance assistance, Food Stamps, most 
federally-funded housing assistance, state assistance based on need, one-third of child support payments, income 
received infrequently or irregularly, and income from a few other sources is excluded when determining eligibility.  
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limits were $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples.
6  As noted above, when states 
administer their own programs they have flexibility to set their own limits on and exclusions for 
income and assets.  But in practice few states have different rules, and when they do the 
differences are typically minor (U.S. Social Security Administration, January 2000).   
The SSI program is large.  In December 2000 there were 1.3 million recipients in the 
aged component of the program (and overall, 2 million recipients aged 65 and over).  About half 
of these 1.3 million recipients receive a federal benefit only, and about half receive at least some 
SSI benefit via a state supplementation.  Total payments for the aged program in 2000 were 
approximately $4.8 billion (overall SSI spending was $31.6 billion), about 75 percent of which 
was in the form of federal benefits, and the remainder state supplements (U.S. Social Security 
Administration, 2001).   
III. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we outline a basic theoretical framework demonstrating why SSI creates 
disincentives for labor supply, in the context of a simple two-period model of labor supply 
without saving or second period work.  For further details and elaboration, see Neumark and 
Powers (2000).   
An agent chooses consumption (c) and work hours (h) in the first period and consumption 
in the second to maximize utility, u(c1,1-h1) + δ uR(c2), where δ  is the intertemporal discount rate.  
Since all income is consumed each period, the single important choice variable is first period 
labor supply.  (The budget constraint in period 1, when the individual is too young for SSI, is c1 
= w1h1.)  First period work hours affect second period retirement income by increasing Social 
Security and private pension benefits.   
                                                 
6 The following assets are excluded from the limit: the prospective recipient’s car, home, and the land the home is 
on; life insurance policies with a face value of up to $1,500; burial plots for the individual and immediate family 
members; and up to $1,500 in burial funds for the individual and his or her spouse.    
 
5 
The key complicating feature in analyzing SSI policy is the nonlinearity of the period 2 
budget constraint.  Let Y0 be the amount of income in retirement that is pre-determined as of 
period 1 (e.g., the level of the Social Security benefit based on the agent’s earnings history prior 
to period 1), and let B(w1h1) be the additional retirement income in period 2 that depends on first 
period earnings (B’>0 and B’’<0 are assumed).  If the agent does not participate in SSI, then the 
second period budget constraint is c2 = Y0 + B(w1h1) (the “autonomous” budget constraint).  If 
the agent participates in SSI, but second period income from non-SSI sources (i.e., Y0 + B(w1h1)) 
is below the disregarded amount, then period 2 income is Y0 + G + B(w1h1) (where G is the 
maximum SSI benefit).  If second period non-SSI income exceeds the disregard, then period 2 
income is G + D (where D is the disregard level), as long as the individual remains eligible for 
SSI, Note that if first period earnings generate too much post-retirement income, the agent will 
be ineligible for SSI, and period 2 income is Y0 + B(w1h1).   
SSI generosity reduces work effort both infra- and infer-marginally.  First, consider the 
infra-marginal effects of a small increase in G on the agent’s optimal choice.  If he optimally 
locates on the autonomous segment of the budget constraint, work effort is unaffected by SSI 
benefit generosity.  If the agent optimally participates in SSI, there are two cases: either his 
private income exceeds the SSI disregard amount, or it does not.  If his non-SSI retirement 
income is below the disregard amount, additional work leads to both increased first period 
consumption and second period (retirement) income, and one can readily show that under 
standard conditions, optimal work hours are decreasing in G.  Under the assumption that utility 
is time-separable, for an SSI participant whose period 2 income exceeds the disregard, the only 
incentive to work is to maintain period 1 consumption, because additional private income in 
period 2 will be taxed away at a 100% rate by the SSI program.  Since SSI cannot be received in  
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the first period, the benefit G cannot influence the labor supply choice.
7   
Due to the segmented budget constraint, one must also consider how changes in SSI 
generosity affect the labor supply choice infer-marginally.  In Neumark and Powers (2000), we 
illustrate how an increase in G shifts both SSI-participation segments of the budget constraint out 
relative to the autonomous budget constraint, encouraging SSI participation and reducing work.  
In addition, an increase in G widens the range of work hours that produce no additional 
retirement income due to SSI policy, further discouraging work. 
When saving is allowed and SSI also has an asset test, B(·) can also be thought of as asset 
income, and the arguments developed above imply that saving to increase asset income post-
retirement will be discouraged (see Hubbard, et al., 1995, for a more complete development of 
the theory underlying the impact of asset tests on saving).  Clearly if asset tests discourage 
saving they will also discourage the additional work needed to raise the stock of assets that 
would normally be drawn down during retirement.  Moreover, assets that are drawn down prior 
to retirement can be used to offset reduced labor supply.  Thus, with saving in the model the 
disemployment incentives of SSI are likely enhanced. 
IV. Data 
We use March CPS files from 1980-2001.  These files ask respondents about labor 
supply in the previous calendar year (usual weekly hours and weeks worked for the previous 
calendar year, which can also be used to code employment in the previous calendar year), as well 
as during the survey week (employment and hours worked).  We examine results using both 
measures of employment and hours.   
We restrict attention to male household heads, aged 60 and older.  Those aged 65 and 
older are used to estimate a model for predicting the probability of SSI participation, based on 
                                                 
7 Work hours can have no influence on period 2 utility, δ uR(G+D).    
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whether they received income from SSI in the previous calendar year.  Those aged 60-64 are 
used to estimate the labor supply models.  In all the estimations the data are weighted using the 
March CPS household weights. 
To the CPS data we append information on SSI benefits at the state level.  Through 1983 
SSI benefits were set each July, and afterwards they were set in January.  For the sample aged 65 
and older that we use to predict SSI participation, we use marital status and the wife’s current 
age to assign the benefit level for either individuals or couples.  For the sample aged 60-64, for 
whom we will both predict SSI participation at age 65 and model contemporaneous labor supply, 
we assign the couple benefit if the individual is married and his wife is no more than three years 
younger than he.  The idea here is that in assessing the benefits of SSI participation, the 
individual will consider the couples benefit level if his wife is sufficiently close in age (three 
years or fewer) that he will face the higher benefit level for most of the prospective retirement 
period.  To keep things simple, when we are using labor supply measures for the survey week we 
use the SSI benefits that prevail in March of the current year, and when we use the labor supply 
measures for the previous calendar year we use the SSI benefits that were set in January of that 
calendar year (or, prior to 1984, the SSI benefits that were set in July of that year.)   
As noted above and explained in more detail in the next section, we use both cross-
section (across-state) and time-series (within-state) variation in SSI benefits.  Nominal maximum 
state supplements for selected years, and measures of both of these types of variation, are 
reported in Table 1.  Looking first at columns (1)-(3) and (1’)-(3’), the table reveals that there 
has been and remains considerable variation in state supplements. Alaska, California, Colorado, 
and Connecticut have the highest benefits over the long haul, while numerous states have rather 
trivial supplements.  The table also shows that there have been relatively few sharp changes in 
state supplements, with the most noticeable being Wisconsin’s elimination of its supplement for  
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couples as of 2000.
8   
In addition to reporting the supplemental benefit levels, the table provides three measures 
of variation in benefits.  The first is the real percentage change in the state supplement from 1985 
to 2000 (columns (4) and (4’)).  For both individuals and couples these percentage changes vary 
widely.  However, notice that the larger percentage changes (e.g., Washington, DC and South 
Dakota) occur for state supplements that are quite small.  Thus, a more meaningful measure of 
changes in benefits is for the combined federal and state benefit.  As shown in columns (5) and 
(5’), there is considerably less variation across states in these changes, although it is important to 
keep in mind that there is also variation relative to states with no supplementation of benefits, in 
which the real value of benefits was virtually unchanged over the sample period.  Note, also, that 
in most states with supplements the real value of the combined state plus federal benefit declined 
over this period.  Finally, for each state the table also shows the percentage difference between 
the total benefit in the state (state plus federal) and the federal benefit, in columns (6) and (6’).  
A comparison of these columns with those showing the time-series variation indicates that the 
across-state variation is far more dramatic.  This suggests that the estimators that rely on the 
time-series (within-state) variation in benefits—while having some important advantages—are 
likely to have more difficulty in accurately estimating the effects of SSI. 
V. The Empirical Approach 
We expect SSI to affect the work behavior of those with a relatively high likelihood of 
eligibility.  To identify such individuals, we analyze samples of people aged 65 and over to 
identify the characteristics of likely SSI participants.  Probit estimates derived from these older 
samples are then applied to the characteristics of workers under age 65 to assign a value of the 
                                                 
8 We report the maximum benefit and use it in the empirical analysis, because we do not know the SSI payments 
that are actually received by individuals, and because these would be endogenous with labor supply.    
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likelihood of future SSI participation to them.  Those with a probability of participation above a 
particular cutoff are characterized as “likely participants,” and the others as “unlikely 
participants.”  Relevant characteristics associated with SSI participation include education (a 
proxy for permanent income), race and other variables reflecting demographic heterogeneity, 
marital status (an indicator of the availability of support from a spouse and intervivos transfers 
from a network of relatives) and past welfare use (an indicator of stigma about using welfare, or 
of unobservables related to eligibility for or need of income-support programs).  Frequently, the 
welfare literature has categorized individuals into treatment or control groups based on a single 
exogenous characteristic (e.g., family structure or education).  Our framework can be viewed as 
broadening this approach to allow a multitude of exogenous factors to determine control and 
treatment group categorizations.
9  
As noted earlier, our previous research on this topic using data from the SIPP relied on 
cross-state variation in state SSI supplements.  We used this variation to construct alternative 
“difference-in-differences” (DD) and “difference-in-difference-in-differences” (DDD) 
estimators.  In the present research, we instead use a data set covering a longer time period, 
which lets us identify the effects of SSI from changes over time in states’ supplemental SSI 
payments, using fixed state effects to control for any unmeasured state-related variables that 
might influence both labor supply and the generosity of SSI and hence bias the estimates relying 
on cross-state variation.  This section first explains our earlier approach, and then explains and 
highlights the advantages of the approach taken in this paper.   
To simplify the exposition, suppose that we can classify states at a point in time as paying 
                                                 
9 Since these participation probabilities are properly considered a part of the model, thought must be given as to how 
their impact is identified in the analysis.  First, the probabilities are estimated using a different sample from the 
sample whose labor supply and saving behavior we analyze.  Second, the estimates are identified through functional 
form given the nonlinearity of the probit model.  Third, when available in a data set, we use variables thought to be 
correlated with knowledge and use of the welfare system, but not directly influencing current saving and work 
decisions, such as previous lifetime experience with another welfare program (e.g., Food Stamps).    
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either high or low benefits (think of low benefits as equivalent to no benefits).  Then we can 
further partition the observations of likely and unlikely SSI participants into four groups: likely 
participants living in high- or low-benefit states, and unlikely participants living in high- or low-
benefit states.
10  
In addition to these basic distinctions, we can further subdivide these groups by age.  We 
focus most on those aged 62-64 for three reasons.  First, given stochastic influences on earnings 
and wealth, older workers can form better predictions of post-retirement income.  Second, we 
suspect that workers pay more attention to the potential receipt of SSI benefits as they approach 
the eligibility age.
11  Finally, as we show elsewhere (Powers and Neumark, 2003a and 2003b), 
the eligibility for early Social Security retirement benefits at age 62 likely enhances the labor 
supply disincentives of SSI beginning at age 62, and in other empirical work (Neumark and 
Powers, 2000) we found evidence of the sharpest labor supply effects for 62-64 year-olds.
12 
To set the stage, although it is not central to our analysis, we begin with the simple 
difference estimator.  Let the labor supply measure be denoted Y, SUPP be a dummy variable for 
states that supplement the SSI benefit (indicating “generous” states), and X a vector of control 
variables (education, race, marital status, a dummy variable indicating that spouse is younger by 
more than three years, and the state unemployment rate in the corresponding year).  Then the 
simple difference estimator for the sample of 62-64 year-old likely participants is  
(1) Yis = ζ + α⋅ SUPPis + Xisψ + εis.        
  In equation (1), α simply measures the difference in labor supply (Y) between likely 
                                                 
10 This two-way dichotomous classification is useful for exposition.  In the empirical analysis the specifications use 
continuous variation in benefit generosity.   
11 See Mitchell (1988) for related evidence regarding pensions, and Cagetti (1999) for related evidence with respect 
to saving.   
12 In our other work, the smaller data sets we used left us with quite small samples of 62-64 year-olds who were 
likely SSI participants.  The much larger CPS lets us obtain much larger samples and more precise estimates for this 
age group.  
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participants in states with generous supplements and likely participants in states without 
generous supplements.  The ‘i’ and ‘s’ subscripts denote individuals and states.  In fact we also 
estimate this specification pooling across multiple years, in which case a ‘t’ subscript would also 
be added, but we omit that subscript here to emphasize the contrast with the estimators below 
that exploit more fully the time-series variation in SSI benefits.  We label this estimator SD.   
If there are other sources of labor supply differences across states, these may spuriously 
be attributed to differences in SSI benefits, as this state-level variation may be correlated with 
SUPP.  This concern led us to implement DD and DDD estimators that are based on the 
introduction of control groups to try to control for state-level labor supply differences across 
states.  Specifically, we want control groups that will exhibit the same cross-state variation in 
labor supply as the older likely participants arising from factors other than SSI benefits.  The 
effects of SSI can then be identified from the difference in the relationship between SSI benefits 
and labor supply between the older likely participants and a control group.  We first discuss 
control groups that parallel our earlier work in relying only on cross-sectional variation in SSI 
benefits, and then move on to those that exploit within-state variation over time.   
One way to control for these state-level state differences when there is primarily cross-
sectional variation in SSI supplements is to use data on younger individuals in the same state 
who are also likely participants, assuming that the state-level labor supply differences are 
common to likely participants across age groups.  In this case the younger individuals control for 
these differences and the effects of SSI are identified from differences in labor supply between 
younger and older likely participants in high- vs. low-benefit states.  Letting OLD be the dummy 
variable indicating those aged 62-64, we can then use a sample of, say, 60-64 year-olds to 
estimate the DD regression 
(2) Yis = ζ + α⋅ SUPPis⋅ OLDis + β⋅ SUPPis + γ⋅ OLDis + Xisψ + εis.     
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  In this regression, β picks up the difference in Y, assumed common to all ages, between 
states with and without generous SSI supplements.  γ captures the difference in Y, common to all 
states, between 60-61 and 62-64 year-olds.  α now captures the extent to which the difference in 
Y between 60-61 and 62-64 year-olds differs in states with generous SSI supplements, relative to 
states without generous supplements, focusing only on likely participants.  We label this 
estimator DD-CS.
13   
Of course, the DD-CS estimator could still rest on invalid identifying assumptions.  In 
particular, DD-CS identifies the effect of SSI from the extent to which the difference in Y for 
likely participants in high-supplement states vs. low-supplement states is greater (or less) for 62-
64 year-olds than for 60-61 year-olds.  But if the slope of the age profile of labor supply is 
different in high-supplement states for other reasons, we may be identifying an effect of 
something other than SSI.  We can solve this problem if we also use the unlikely participants to 
capture state-specific differences in age profiles.  This difference-in-difference-in-difference 
(DDD) estimator requires the assumption that state-specific factors affecting the slopes of age 
profiles of labor supply are common to likely and unlikely participants in a state.  In this case, we 
use the sample of all 60-64 year-olds, and estimate the effect of SSI from the regression  
(3) Yis = ζ + α⋅ SUPPis⋅ PARTis⋅ OLDis + β⋅ SUPPis + γ⋅ OLDis + δ⋅ PARTis  
        + θ⋅ SUPPis⋅ OLDis + κ⋅ SUPPis⋅ PARTis + λ⋅ OLDis⋅ PARTis+ Xisψ + εis.    
In this regression β again picks up the difference in Y between states with and without 
generous SSI supplements, γ captures the difference between 62-64 and 60-61 year-olds, and δ 
measures the difference between likely and unlikely participants.  The simple interactions 
capture the differences between older and younger individuals in high- vs. low-supplement states 
                                                 
13 In some of our earlier work we also used men aged 40-59 as a control group.  The closer age group should provide 
a better control group as their behavior is more likely to be the same except for the influence of SSI.  
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(θ), likely and unlikely participants in high- vs. low-supplement states (κ), and 62-64 year-old 
likely participants vs. unlikely participants (λ).  What α identifies, then, is the extent to which the 
difference in Y between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old likely participants, relative to the 
difference between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old unlikely participants, varies between high- 
and low-supplement states.  Thus, α identifies the effect of SSI after netting out state-specific 
variation in changes in labor supply with age.  We denote this estimator DDD-CS to indicate that 
it is a DDD estimator that can be estimated using only the cross-state variation in SSI benefits.  
There is also an alternative DD estimator that controls for state-specific differences in 
labor supply using individuals in the state who are of the same age, but who are unlikely 
participants.  However, we have more confidence in those with characteristics associated with 
likely participation serving as a control group for the labor supply behavior of 62-64 year-old 
likely participants.  Reflecting this (we believe), in other work we have done exploiting 
administrative Social Security Administration records matched to SIPP data to estimate similar 
specifications, we found that among the two alternative DD estimators, only the one using the 
younger likely participants as the control yielded strong evidence of employment disincentives 
from SSI (Neumark and Powers, 2002).   
Naturally, this raises questions about using unlikely participants as a second level of 
control in the DDD estimator.  Indeed, this concern is part of the reason for turning to a data set 
that allows us to exploit time-series variation in state supplemental SSI benefits, as the time-
series variation allows the implementation of different estimators using different control groups 
to account for spurious sources of associations between SSI and pre-retirement labor supply, and 
in particular allows a DDD estimator that does not rely on using the unlikely participants as a 
control.   
The estimators described thus far can be implemented with a single cross-section or with  
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repeated cross-sections and are the ones we use in Neumark and Powers (2000).
14  With repeated 
cross-sections, time-series variation in benefits played a role, but because our repeated cross-
sections covered a short time period, the primary source of variation was across states.  As noted 
in the Introduction, however, in this paper we use data covering a much longer time span and 
therefore are interested in exploiting the time-series variation in SSI benefits more fully.   
To see the advantages afforded by this time-series variation, consider first the SD 
estimator in equation (1).  We noted that this estimator is potentially problematic because of 
state-level differences in labor supply of older individuals that could be correlated with SSI 
benefits.  The estimator DD-CS attacks this problem by introducing a control group from the 
same cross-sectional data set from which the older individuals are taken—in particular, younger 
likely participants.  An alternative is to use observations on likely participants in the same age 
group, but from different years when SSI benefits were at different levels.  This entails 
estimating equation (1) for multiple years, with state dummy variables (STATE) to capture the 
state-level differences, and year dummy variables (YEAR) to capture common changes over 
time, as in  
(4) Yist = ζ + α⋅ SUPPist + STATEisπ + YEARitρ + Xistψ + εist, 
where we have added a ‘t’ subscript to emphasize using the time-series variation in SSI benefits.  
This is an alternative DD estimator, which we denote DD-TS since it uses time-series 
observations from other periods in the same state to generate the control group.  In this model π 
captures state-specific differences in labor supply, and ρ captures differences over time common 
to states.  The DD estimator α then identifies the effects of SSI from the differences in changes 
over time across states with different changes in SSI benefit generosity. 
                                                 
14 When implemented with repeated cross-sections, year fixed effects are included to absorb time-series fluctuations 
in labor market outcomes common to all states.  
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The DD estimators DD-TS and DD-CS are based on different assumptions as to what 
observations provide the best control group to capture state-level differences in labor supply that 
might generate a spurious correlation between SSI benefits and the labor supply of older likely 
SSI participants.  We are inclined to prefer DD-TS because it uses observations on exactly the 
same types of individuals—likely participants aged 62-64—to obtain a control group.  On the 
other hand, as noted in the discussion of Table 1, there is not a tremendous amount of time-series 
variation in SSI benefits, and as the time horizon gets longer we have to be concerned about the 
comparability of behavior of older individuals many years apart.        
The estimator DD-TS identifies the effects of SSI from whether labor supply of older 
likely participants changes by more in states that increase their benefits than in states that do 
not.
15  However, just as in the case of DD-CS there is a concern with a spurious relationship 
between SSI benefits and labor supply—which motivated the DDD-CS estimator—so too is 
there a similar concern in the case of DD-TS.  Since this latter estimator uses time-series 
variation, however, the concern is that there are changes over time in labor supply that are 
spuriously correlated with time-series changes in benefit generosity.  In that case, we again want 
to introduce a control group that we believe will exhibit the same time-series changes in labor 
supply as the older likely participants that are attributable to factors other than SSI, so that the 
effects of SSI can be identified from differences in changes in labor supply between older likely 
participants and the control group associated with changes in SSI benefits.  Paralleling the earlier 
discussion, we can use younger likely participants in the same state, with the regression model  
(5) Yist = ζ + α⋅ SUPPist⋅ OLDist + β⋅ SUPPist + γ⋅ OLDist + STATEisπ + YEARitρ  
  + OLDist⋅ STATEisθ + OLDist⋅ YEARitκ + Xistψ + εist. 
                                                 
15 While we have couched the explanations of the estimators in terms of a dummy variable for generous benefits, 
clearly this analysis will be more meaningful in terms of continuous variation in benefits.   
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In this model θ captures fixed differences across states between the labor supply of 
younger and older likely participants.  This parallels the addition of older and younger unlikely 
participants to the DD-CS estimator to allow for the possibility that there were differences in the 
labor supply profile associated with variation in SSI benefits.  There the variation was across 
states, so these differences were captured by differencing relative to the profile for unlikely 
participants; here the variation is over time, so these differences are captured by differencing 
relative to the profile in other years for the same states.  κ captures differences in the common 
time-series changes in labor supply for older (versus younger) likely participants.  The DDD 
estimator α then measures the difference in the change in labor supply of older versus younger 
likely participants associated with changes in SSI benefits.  We denote this estimator DDD-TS.  
An important advantage of this estimator relative to DDD-CS is that it does not rely at all on 
using data on unlikely participants, a group which, as we noted above, may not be an ideal 
control group.  The various estimators discussed in this section and used in the next section are 
summarized in Table 2.   
VI. Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Predictors of SSI Participation  
Descriptive statistics for the samples of 62-64 and 60-61 year-old men are reported in the 
first two columns of Table 3.  All four labor supply measures reveal significant drop-offs after 
age 61; for example, the current employment rate falls from 64.6 to 45.1 percent.  On other 
dimensions, of course, these subsamples are very similar.   
  Estimates of the probit model used to predict SSI participation, which in turn is used to 
select a group of likely SSI participants for analysis, are presented in column (3); the estimates 
have been transformed into marginal effects.  SSI participation is based on whether the 
individual reported income from SSI in the past year.  In the CPS, there is no way of knowing  
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that the individual was originally a participant in the aged component of the SSI program.  In 
principle it would be desirable to drop those with a disability—who might be receiving SSI 
under the disabled or blind components of the program—from the analysis.  But information on 
disability is elicited only for those not employed, so that this information is a function of the 
dependent variables used in some of our analyses.   
  In the SSI participation model, all of the estimates are strongly statistically significant.  
Not surprisingly, the real value of the SSI benefit is positively associated with SSI participation.  
The magnitude of the estimate implies that a $100 increase in monthly benefits (about a 25 
percent increase relative to the sample mean) raises the participation probability by 0.0064, a 20 
percent increase relative to the participation rate of men aged 65 and over of 0.0316, implying an 
elasticity of 0.85.  We would expect that variables positively related to lifetime income or 
wealth, as well as current earning opportunities, would be negatively associated with SSI 
participation.  This is borne out in the negative effect of education, and the positive effect of 
black and the state unemployment rate.  Similar to what we found in SIPP data, we find that 
through 11 years of schooling higher education is associated with a lower likelihood of SSI 
participation; participation is lower for those with 12 or more years of schooling, although the 
marginal effect of education beyond high school is minimal.  This was apparent in a specification 
with much more-detailed education controls, and is captured in the specification reported here 
(and used throughout) by including an interaction between years of education and a dummy 
variable for less than a high school education, as well as a dummy variable for a high school 
education or more.
16  In addition, given that never married men typically earn less than divorced, 
widowed, or separated men, who in turn earn less than married men, net of other controls 
                                                 
16 For the estimates reported in column (3), for example, relative to someone with eight years of schooling the 
probability of participation is lower by 0.007 for someone with ten years of schooling, 0.011 for someone with 11 
years of schooling, and 0.036 for someone with 12 or more years of schooling.  
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(Korenman and Neumark, 1991), as we expect never married men are considerably more likely 
to participate in SSI, and divorced, widowed, or separated men somewhat more likely.  Finally, 
perhaps reflecting both resources and heterogeneity with respect to willingness to take-up public 
support programs, Food Stamp recipients are more likely to participate in SSI.   
  We use the estimates of this model to predict the probability of SSI participation of 60-
64 year-olds, so that we can identify likely participants.
17  For most of our analyses, we use a 
cutoff of the 90
th centile of the distribution of predicted probabilities of SSI participation to 
identify these likely participants.  As reported in the last row of column (3), the 90
th centile of the 
distribution is a 0.035 probability of participation.  This is, of course, a relatively low probability, 
but there are no doubt many determinants of SSI participation that are unobserved to the 
researcher, so that many individuals at this predicted probability have a much higher probability 
in fact.  In addition, the estimated probability of participation climbs sharply above the 90
th 
centile, to 0.084 at the 95
th centile and 0.470 at the 99
th centile.  But using a cutoff such as the 
99
th would yield too small a sample for analysis.  If we use the top decile of the distribution, and 
one-third of these individuals actually participate, that would apparently account for most 
participants, since the actual participation rate for those aged 65 and over in the sample is 0.032.  
But given that some participants are likely to come from lower down in the distribution, in 
analyses of the robustness of the results we also experiment with using the 70
th and 80
th centiles.  
Conversely, to examine the sensitivity of the estimates to using a more stringent cutoff, we also 
report results using the 95
th centile. 
Labor Supply Estimates—Graphical Analysis 
Prior to presenting the regression results, in order to help cement the intuition underlying 
                                                 
17 To keep the “treatment” and “control groups” the same, when we predict these probabilities we net out the SSI 
supplement, so that individuals in states with different supplements but with identical characteristics (as captured in 
the other controls) are assigned the same probability of participation.  For the same reason, we do not include fixed 
state effects in the participation probits, since these would reflect in large part cross-state variation in SSI benefits.  
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the central estimators a graphical display of the data and illustration of some of these estimators 
is presented in Figure 1.  The upper row of Figure 1 illustrates the simple difference (SD) 
estimator and the difference-in-differences estimator (DD-CS), which rely on cross-state 
variation in SSI supplements.  To construct these plots we use the sample of likely participants.  
We define by the vector Z all of the control variables in X in equation (1), as well as the year 
dummy variables.  We then regress both the labor supply measure (usual weekly hours) and the 
combined state and federal SSI benefit on Z, and form the residuals.  We then plot the residuals 
from the labor supply regression against the residuals from the SSI benefit regression.  This is 
informative because the regression coefficient from the simple regression for these residuals is 
exactly the coefficient that would result from estimating equation (1).   
The upper-left-most panel simply presents the residual scatter plot for likely participants 
aged 62-64 over the entire sample period.  As indicated by the solid line, the simple regression of 
the residual hours measure on the residual SSI benefit, which is the SD estimator, is positively 
sloped, rather than negatively sloped as predicted by the theory.  The center panel in the upper 
row presents the same scatter plot, but for 60-61 year-old likely participants.  Recall that the 
younger likely participants are used as the control sample in the DD-CS estimator.  The 
regression line for this group also slopes upward.  The upper-right-hand panel graphs the 
difference in slopes between the regression lines for the 62-64 year-olds and the 60-61 year-olds.  
This is the DD-CS estimator.  It is downward sloping.  The downward slope arises because in the 
first two scatter plots labor supply rises less quickly with the SSI benefit for the 62-64 year-olds 
than for the 60-61 year-olds.  Assuming that the regression line for the 60-61 year-olds reflects 
unmeasured state differences associated with both labor supply and SSI benefits, it is the 
difference between the two slopes of the regression lines that identifies the effect of SSI.  As 
shown in the right-hand panel (with a different scale), the difference between these slopes yields  
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the negative effect that is predicted by the theory.   
The bottom row of graphs displays the DD-TS and DDD-TS estimators that rely on time-
series variation in SSI benefits within states.  The observations plotted in these graphs are similar 
to those in the top row of graphs, except that prior to running the regressions and calculating the 
residuals, all of the variables are demeaned relative to their state-specific means—precisely the 
transformation that is done for the fixed effects or within-group estimator.  The lower-left-most 
graph displays the scatter plot of the residuals from these regressions for the within-state 
deviations of hours and benefits (i.e., the deviations of the individual data from the state means 
computed over all years) for 62-64 year-old likely participants.  The regression line through 
these points is the DD-TS estimator.  It is downward sloped, consistent with the theoretical 
prediction.  The second panel in the bottom row is the parallel scatter plot for 60-61 year-olds.  It 
too is downward sloped.  If there were unmeasured changes over time associated with both 
changes in labor supply and in SSI benefits, then these 60-61 year-olds serve as a control sample 
for this analysis, and the DDD-TS estimator is the difference between these slopes.  Such 
changes are plausible, because employment among older men was falling over this period for a 
host of reasons, and SSI benefits were also falling in real terms, which would generate a positive 
correlation between changes in labor supply and changes in SSI benefits.  But because the 
downward slope is less steep for the 60-61 year-olds, the third graph in the bottom row, which 
displays the DDD-TS estimate, is negatively sloped (note that the scale is different), again 
consistent with the theory. 
Labor Supply Estimates—Regression Analysis  
Regression results from implementing each of the alternative estimators described in 
Section V and summarized in Table 2 are reported in Table 4.  The first three rows report 
estimates that rely on cross-sectional (cross-state) variation in SSI benefits.  In the SD estimates  
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of the effect of SSI on labor supply, reported in the first row, three of the four estimates are 
positive, but none are statistically significant.  However, when the 60-61 year-olds are used as a 
control sample, in the DD-CS estimates in the second row, the estimates become negative, and 
for the labor supply measures from the previous calendar year these estimated labor supply 
effects are statistically significant (although one at only the ten-percent level).  We expect the 
results for the previous year’s measures to be stronger, as these likely reflect more permanent 
behavior than labor supply measures for a single week.  The final cross-sectional estimator is the 
DDD-CS estimator, which compares the differences between 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old 
likely participants to the differences between the 62-64 year-old and 60-61 year-old unlikely 
participants.  These estimates are quite similar to those from the DD-CS estimator; all are 
negative, and again the estimates for the previous year’s labor supply measures are statistically 
significant, although only at the ten-percent level.    
The final two rows of Table 4 report the results from the new estimators using the time-
series variation in SSI benefits within states.  The DD-TS estimator using only the 62-64 year-
olds yields negative but insignificant estimates.  But the preferred DDD-TS estimator, which 
compares the relationship between labor supply and benefit changes for 62-64 versus 60-61 year-
olds, yields much stronger evidence of negative effects of SSI benefits on labor supply.  For 
three of the four labor supply measures the estimated effects are statistically significant, one at 
the one-percent level, one at the five-percent level, and one at the ten-percent level.  Again, the 
stronger evidence emerges for the labor supply measures that cover the entire previous calendar 
year, rather than just the survey week.  Interestingly, the stronger evidence from the DDD-TS 
estimator results mainly from smaller standard errors rather than different coefficient estimates.   
Using the estimates for the calendar year labor supply measures, for the employment 
measures the estimated magnitude implies that a $100 increase in monthly SSI benefits (or a  
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$1,200 increase in annual benefits) reduces the employment rate by 0.05.  Based on the figures in 
Table 3, this implies an elasticity of −0.36, which considering that this applies only to likely 
participants does not seem like an unreasonable magnitude.  For hours, the same increase in 
benefits reduces hours by 1.87, implying a similar elasticity of −0.34. 
Table 5 presents some robustness analyses of the estimators using time-series variation in 
SSI benefits.  The first panel of Table 5 varies from the last two rows of Table 4 only by 
dropping the CPS sample weights.  All of the estimates remain negative, although the estimated 
labor supply effects decline a bit in absolute value in almost every case.  But for the previous 
year’s labor supply measures the DDD-TS estimates remain statistically significant.
18   
The next three panels vary the cutoff of the predicted probability of SSI participation 
used to identify likely participants, using two lower cutoffs (the 70
th and 80
th centiles), and one 
higher cutoff (the 95
th centile).  Although we emphasize the DDD-TS estimators more, it is 
worth noting that for the alternative cutoffs there is some variation in whether the DD-TS 
estimate of the effects of SSI on labor supply is negative.  But looking at the results for the 
DDD-TS estimator, whatever cutoff is used there is evidence of negative labor supply effects of 
higher SSI benefits.  Perhaps most interesting, in the DDD-TS estimates the magnitudes of the 
labor supply effects generally indicate stronger negative effects the higher the cutoff, and this is 
always true going from the 80
th, to the 90
th, to the 95
th centile (the size of the effect is flipped for 
the 70
th versus 80
th comparison in two of the four cases, although the differences are small).  For 
example, the results for employed last year indicate that a $100 increase in SSI benefits is 
associated with a reduction in this probability of 0.018 using the 70
th centile, 0.027 using the 80
th 
centile, 0.050 using the 90
th centile (Table 4), and 0.064 using the 95
th centile.  Moreover, the 
                                                 
18 Note that the sample sizes change somewhat.  That occurs because in the weighted estimates the 90
th centile cutoff 
is computed based on weighted data, so the actual number of observations above this cutoff can differ from the 
unweighted data.  The sample sizes can also differ slightly across changes in the specification of the SSI 
participation probit because of ties at the centiles used as cutoffs.  
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statistical evidence is considerably stronger using the highest cutoff, as for the 95
th centile all 
four of the labor supply estimates are statistically significant (one at the ten-percent level only).  
Qualitatively, we would expect to find stronger labor supply disincentives for more likely 
participants, as those more likely to participate should be more responsive to the incentives 
posed by SSI.
19   
Finally, in our work with the SIPP we examined results excluding those with work-
impairing disabilities, because among disabled men younger than 65 there may be some negative 
labor supply response to higher SSI payments for the disabled in high-benefit states.  As noted 
earlier, we cannot identify those with a work-impairing disability in the CPS, except for the non-
employed.  Instead, we drop from the 60-64 year-old sample those reporting any SSI income.  
Assuming this income flows to the respondent, and not to his spouse or another family member, 
receipt of SSI income is an indicator of disability.  The results are reported in the final panel of 
Table 5, and are very similar to the otherwise comparable estimates in Table 4.   
VII. Conclusions 
Economic theory suggests that increased generosity of SSI payments will induce some 
labor supply reductions among older individuals who are approaching the age of eligibility for 
SSI and have sufficiently low resources that these labor supply reductions will help keep post-
retirement income and assets below the levels that would make them ineligible.  This effect is 
likely to be particularly noticeable beginning at age 62, when potential future SSI recipients can 
replace the income lost from reducing labor supply by taking early social security retirement; 
also note that there will be no long-lasting early retirement "penalty" since these are negated 
                                                 
19 This prediction is not hard and fast, because it is conceivable that the margin on which SSI has its strongest effect 
on labor supply is for those with less than the highest likelihood of participation, and not for those who will 
participate under almost any circumstances.  However, recall that even the 95
th centile of the distribution of 
predicted probabilities of SSI participation was less than 0.1, so it is likely that throughout the range of cutoffs we 
consider we are focusing on those whose behavior may well be influenced by the size of the SSI benefit.       
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once the household gets on SSI at age 65.   
Past research relying on cross-state variation in SSI benefits found evidence consistent 
with the predicted negative labor supply effects.  However, a reliance on cross-state variation 
necessitated reliance on less-than-ideal control samples.  In contrast, this paper uses CPS data 
covering a 21-year period, hence permitting identification of the effects of SSI from within-state, 
time-series variation in SSI benefits, using a control sample of individuals of similar ages, in the 
same states, and with similar probabilities of participating in SSI.   
The evidence points consistently to negative effects of more generous SSI payments on 
the labor supply of likely SSI participants aged 62-64.  The implied elasticities of labor supply 
with respect to benefits, for those with a high probability of SSI participation, are generally in the 
range of −0.2 to −0.3, looking at both employment and hours of work.   
These negative labor supply effects do not imply that more generous SSI payments 
constitute unwise social policy.  Such incentives are an unavoidable consequence of insurance 
against reaching old age with very low economic resources.  It is likely, however, that these 
negative labor supply effects are exacerbated by the low income and asset levels below which 
retirees must fall to be eligible for SSI (infer-marginal incentives), and by the 100-percent 
confiscation of Social Security income in the SSI formula (infra-marginal incentives).  While 
bounds are necessary to target the most needy, the negative labor supply effects prior to 
eligibility for SSI (and the negative savings effects we have found in our other work) indicate 
that the income and asset limits have the perverse effect of inhibiting the accumulation of 
resources—however minimal—by the economically-disadvantaged elderly.  Thus, while these 
findings do not lead to any clear implications regarding how SSI ought to be structured, they 
highlight the tradeoffs inherent in structuring and targeting this particular social insurance 
program.  It is probably worth thinking about alternative ways of structuring SSI that would  
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increase incentives to accumulate economic resources without generating large and costly 
increases in eligibility for SSI.  In considering such alternatives, policy-makers may be able to 
exploit the inherent limitations to growth in the SSI rolls provided by social security.  In 
particular, at least insofar as increased resource accumulation is reflected in greater social 
security wealth, potential SSI recipients become ineligible for SSI or eligible for reduced SSI 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Probit Estimates for SSI Participation 
  Descriptive statistics,  
all male heads of household 
Probit for SSI 
participation 
Descriptive statistics,  
likely participants 
  Ages 62-64  Ages 60-61  Ages 65+  Ages 62-64  Ages 60-61 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Currently employed (%)   45.1  64.6    28.0  38.6 
Employed last year (%)  58.1  73.7    39.4  49.5 
Hours last week  16.5  25.4    9.1  14.2 
Usual weekly hours last year  23.0  30.8    14.7  19.7 
Real maximum monthly 
federal plus state SSI 
payment (1982-84 $) 





11.9 12.1    6.6  6.7 
Education x less than high 
school education 
   -0.0035 
(0.0001) 
  
High school education or 
more 










4.0% 3.7%  0.0384 
(0.0034) 
17.9% 18.8% 
Divorced, widowed, or 
separated 
12.9% 11.7% 0.0111 
(0.0011) 
31.1% 26.2% 
Eligible for married couple 
benefit (married & wife age 
65+) 
   -0.0156 
(0.0010) 
  
Received Food Stamps last 
year 
3.3% 3.6%  0.2420 
(0.0068) 
32.2% 38.1% 
State unemployment rate (%)  6.4  6.4  0.0017 
(0.0002) 
7.1 7.2 
       
Number of observations  31,728  22,587  135,901  3,501  2,314 
Mean participation 
probability 
   0.0316    
90
th centile of predicted 
probability for 60-64 year-
olds 
   0.0352    
In column (3), the marginal effects implied by the probit estimates are reported; standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, with t-statistics scaled to equal those in the probit estimation.  The standard errors are adjusted to be robust to 
heteroscedasticity of the error term across clusters defined by state and year, and to arbitrary correlations of the error 
terms within these clusters.  The probit includes fixed year effects.  In the probit estimation, the SSI benefit is divided by 
$100, so the marginal effect can be interpreted as arising from a $100 increase in monthly benefits.  When computing 
predicted probabilities, the supplement variable was set to its sample mean.  Married heads with no corresponding spouse 
record in the CPS were excluded from all analyses.  The omitted marital status category is married heads with younger 
spouses.  
 
Table 4: Alternative Estimators of the Effect of SSI Benefits on Employment and Hours 
  Currently 
employed 
Employed  
last year  
Hours worked last 
week 
Usual weekly 
hours last year 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Cross-sectional estimators       
























Within-state  estimators      
















The SSI benefit is divided by $100, so the marginal effect can be interpreted as the effect of a $100 increase in monthly 
benefits.  The SSI benefit is aligned with the labor supply measure, so in columns (1) and (3) the benefit is for the year of 
the survey, and in columns (2) and (4) the benefit is for the prior year.   The equations include controls for education, race, 
marital status, the state unemployment rate, and year, as well as the variables for SUPP, PART, and their interactions as 
explained in Section V.  Only the estimates of the parameter α in equations (1)-(5) are reported.  Standard errors of the 
estimates are reported in parentheses.  The standard errors are adjusted to be robust to heteroscedasticity of the error term 
across clusters defined by state, year, age (when 60-61 year-olds are included), and likely participation (when unlikely 
participants are included), and to arbitrary correlations of the error terms within these clusters.  ‘*’, ‘**”, and ‘***’ 
indicate that the estimate is statistically significant at the ten-, five-, or one-percent level.   All specifications use a 
continuous measure of the SSI benefit, and the 90
th centile cutoff for predicted probability of SSI participation.   
 
 
Table 5: Robustness Analysis of Within-State Estimators of the Effect of SSI Benefits on Employment and Hours  
  Currently 
employed 
Employed  
last year  
Hours worked last 
week 
Usual weekly 
hours last year 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Unweighted       





















th centile cutoff for predicted 






























th centile cutoff for predicted 
probability of SSI participation 
     





















th centile cutoff for predicted 
probability of SSI participation 
     




















Excluding current SSI recipients         




















See notes to Table 4.  Specifications correspond to those in Table 4 aside from the exceptions noted.  
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